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EVIDENCE: JUDGMENTS AND PLEAS IN PRIOR
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS AS EVIDENCE
IN CIVIL ACTIONS
ALTHOUGH a plea of guilty in a prior criminal prosecution was ad-
missible at common law, the record of the judgment was not admissible
as evidence of the facts upon which it was based.1 This exclusionary
rule, based on technicalities, has been widely criticized. The facet of
the rule which excludes prior criminal convictions is gradually being
eroded; the rule as to acquittals, however, remains unchanged.
CONVICTIONS
Many courts today still hold that a criminal conviction is not ad-
missible in a subsequent civil action as evidence of the facts upon which
the judgment was rendered.2 Various rationalizations have been offered
for this position. One reason frequently advanced for the exclusion of
prior convictions is the maxim res inter alios acta,8 the belief being that
something done between two parties should not operate to the dis-
advantage of a third.' However, as can readily be seen, this is not a
'Smith v. Rummens, i Camp. N.P. 9, 17o Eng. Rep. 858 (K.B. 1807) (Lord
Ellenborough) ; The King v. Warden of the Fleet, 12 Mod. Rep. 337, 88 Eng. Rep.
1363 (K.B. 1700); z FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 653 ( 5 th ed. 1925) [hereinafter
cited as FREEMAN].
'E.g., Silva v. Silva, 297 Mass. 217, 7 N.E.2d 6ox (1937) 5 Girard v. Vermont
Mut. Ins. Co., 103 Vt. 330, 154 Ati. 666 (931) ; Interstate Dry Goods Stores v.
Williamson, 9 x W.Va. 156, 112 S.E. 301 (192z) (dictum)5 Hollington v. F.
Hewthorn & Co. [1943] 1 K.B. 587. See generally, JONES, EVIDENCE § 639 (5th
ed. 1958) 5 McCoRMicx, EVIDENCE § 295 (1954); PHiPsON, EVIDENCE 407 (8th ed.
1942); 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE §§ 634-644 (12th ed. 1955); 4 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 1346a (3rd ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]; 5 WIGMORE
§ 167ia. A conviction is, however, admissible to establish the fact of conviction,
Brown v. Bradlee, 156 Mass. 28, 30 N.E. 85 (1892) (action on contract for reward
offered for evidence leading to arrest and conviction), or to attack the credibility of a
witness. 4 WIGMORE § 980.
'See generally Cowen, The A4dmissibility of Criminal Convictions in Subsequent
Civil Proceedings, 40 CALIF. L. REV. 225 (1952).
"E.g., Balestreiri v. Arques, 49 Cal. App. 2d 664, 122 P.2d 277 (194.2) ; Doyle
v. Gore, 15 Mont. 212, 38 Pac. 939 (x895) 5 Interstate Dry Goods Stores v. William-
son, 91 W.Va. 156, 112 S.E. 301 (X922); Hollington v. F. Hewthorn & Co. [19431
x K.B. 587. This reasoning would be valid where the plaintiff in the civil action seeks
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valid ground for the exclusionary rule. The introduction of the prior
conviction operates to the disadvantage of the defendant in the criminal
suit rather than the one who was not a party.
Two other justifications frequently given for excluding the con-
victions are lack of mutuality5 and the different standards of proof in
criminal and civil suits.6 The latter is dearly inapplicable since the
facts upon which the conviction was based were established beyond a
reasonable doubt, while in the subsequent civil litigation, only a pre-
ponderance of the evidence is required. The lack of mutuality objec-
tion has no validity for the same reason. The rationale of this objection
is that the record of conviction should not be admissible as evidence of
the facts upon which it was based because the accused, if found innocent,
could not have introduced the record of acquittal as evidence of his
innocence. The fallacy of this sophism is apparent-an acquittal is
merely a finding that guilt has not been established beyond a reasonable
doubt, while the plaintiff in the civil action need only prove fault by a
preponderance of the evidence. Thus a rule admitting a conviction
and excluding an acquittal would not be an unwarranted discrimination
between the plaintiff and the defendant, but rather a recognition of the
difference in probative value of the evidence.'
to introduce the conviction of a third party as evidence of the liability of the de-
fendant, Lipman Bros. Inc. v. Hartford Acc. & Indm. Co., 149 Me. x99, oo A.2ad
246 (1953), or where the defendant attempts to introduce the conviction of a third
party in order to defeat plaintiff's claim. Bibbs v. Fidelity Health & Ace. Co., 71
S.W.2d 764 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934), Warren v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 2x5 N.C. 402, 2
S.E.2d 17 (1939)-5 E.g., Beckworth v. Phillips, 6 Ga. App. 859, 65 S.E. 1075 (19o9); Silva V.
Silva, 297 Mass. 217, 7 N.E.2d 6oz (1937); Girard v. Vermont Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
103 Vt. 330, 154 At. 666 (93x); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Anderson, 200 Va.
385, 1o5 S.E.zd 869 (1958) (dictum). And see cases cited in 2 FREEMAN § 654
n.17.
"E.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Murdaugh, 94 F.2d io4 ( 4th Cir. 1938)
(dictum); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. O'Quin, 124 Ga. 357, 52 S.E. 427 (xgo5); Wilson
v. Manhatten Ry. 2 Misc. 127, 20 N.Y. Supp. 852, af'd 144 N.Y. 632, 39 N.E. 495
(1894); Interstate Dry Goods Stores v. Williamson, 9z W.Va. x56, 112 S.E. 301
(1922). And see cases cited in 2 FREEMAN § 654. n.4.
Any policy upon which the res judicata doctrine of mutuality is founded is clearly
inapplicable here because of the different standards of proof. Moreover, even in a
res judicata situation some courts have abandoned the requirement of mutuality and
confined the requirement of privity to the party against whom the plea of resr judicata
was made. See Davis v. McKinnon & Mooney, 266 F.ad 870 (6th Cir. 1959);
Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, x9 Cal.2d 807, 122 P.2d 892
(1942); Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine,
9 STAN. L. REV. 281 (1957); Polasky, Collateral Rstoppel--Effects of Prior Litiga-
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Convictions have also been excluded on the grounds that their
admission would violate the opinion and hearsay rules.8 Although it is
true that a conviction and judgment are based on hearsay and the
opinion of the jury, the logical outcome of this reasoning would result
in also precluding introduction of judgments in prior civil actions and
would therefore undercut the whole doctrine of res judicata. The fact
that numerous cases have admitted prior convictions indicates that these
objections are not insurmountable obstacles to the admission of such
evidence.'
Some courts have rejected rigid adherence to the general exclusion-
ary rule and instead have inquired into the seriousness of the crime
involved and the proposed use of the conviction in the civil action."0
In effect, these courts distinguish between defensive and offensive
utilization of the conviction. The former involves using the conviction
to defeat an action later brought by the convicted person or his privy;
the latter involves its use by a plaintiff as evidence of the fault of the
convicted person.
i. Defensive Use and the Schindler Rule
Some courts, unable to accept the anomalous result of one's obtaining
an advantage or profit from his own wrongdoing as shown by the con-
viction, have evolved the rule that a conviction is admissible when in-
troduced to prevent a criminal from enforcing a claim arising out of
his crime." This rule and the tests for it were carefully analyzed in
tiOn, 39 IowA L. REv. 27 (1954). But see RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 93
(1942).8 Hollington v. F. Hewthorn & Co., 11943] 1 K.B. 587. But see Hinton, Judgment
of Conviction-Effect in a Civil Case as Res Judicata or as Evidence, 27 ILL. L. REV.
195 (193z) (feels that hearsay and opinion objections justify exclusion).
' The hearsay and opinion objections would appear to be merely technical obstacles;
if they were valid the same reasoning would apply to exclude official reports.
The hearsay obstacle is easily surmounted since the party against which the con-
viction is offered was present at the criminal trial, was confronted with the witnesses
and had the right to cross-examine. Wigmore states that "the opinion rule . . . is
not intrinsically applicable here2' 5 WIGMORE § 167ia at 689. See generally
Comment, 2x CAN. B. REV. 658 (1943).
0 "c[A]n enlightened conscience does not permit us to cling to the archaic rule of
complete exclusion for all purposes when such a fact has been solemnly and judicially
determined. Greater weight is to be given to this conclusion when the fact of guilt
is established beyond a reasonable doubt in a trial in which the accused is surrounded
by all of the safeguards afforded by law." North River Ins. Co. v. Militello, xoo
Coo. 343, 347, 67 P.2d 625, 626 (1937).
"Maybee v. Avery, 18 Johns. 352 (N.Y. x8zo), was one of the earliest decisions
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Schindler v. Royal Insurance Company.1 2 The court there held that
the prior conviction was admissible against a convicted arsonist who was
attempting to recover on an insurance policy covering the goods which
he had been convicted of burning. The court not only rejected the
exclusionary rule, but further held that the conviction was prima facie
evidence of the facts upon which it was based. The Schindler decision
has been followed in many jurisdictions.1 3  Some courts, however, have
regarded the prior conviction only as some evidence of guilt, 4 and
others have deemed it to be conclusive, hence barring the subsequent
plaintiff.' 5
There can be no doubt that the Schindler rule is more logical than
the traditional exclusionary rule. A person convicted of a serious crime
has had both an opportunity and a motivation to defend and has had
his guilt established beyond a reasonable doubt. The obvious social
policy served by refusing to allow a criminal to profit by his crime
advancing this rule.
"The rule of exclusion is a shield for the protection of those who have had no
opportunity to assert their defense. To apply it here would be to convert it into a
sword in the hands of one who has had such opportunity, to be used by him for the
effectuation of the same fraud which has been established." Eagle, Star & British
Dominions Ins. Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 8z, io6, 140 S.E. 314, 321 (927).
12 258 N.Y. 310, 179 N.E. 711 (1932).
" E.g., New York & Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 3z F. Supp. 251
(S.D.N.Y. 1940); Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of the World v. Gunn, 229 Ala. 5O8,
x58 So. 19Z (934); North River Ins. Co. v. Militello, 100 Colo. 343, 67 P.zd 6z5(1937).
However, some jurisdictions still follow the exclusionary rule in this situation.
E.g., Silva v. Silva, 297 Mass. 217, 7 N.E.zd 6ox (x937); Lillie v. Modern Wood-
men of America, 89 Neb. i, 13o N.W. 1004 (1911); Girard v. Vermont Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 103 Vt. 330, 154 Atl. 666 (1931).
The English courts followed the admissibility rule for a time, Mash v. Darley,
[1914] 1 K.B. i; In Re Crippen, [1911] P. io8; but reverted to the exclusionary
rule, Hollington v. F. Hewthorn & Co., [x913] i K.B. 587, although that case in-
volved offensive use of the conviction.
"E.g., Fidelity-Pheonix Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 2z6 Ala. 226, x66 So. 604, cert.
danied, 299 U.S. 557 (1936); Douglas v. Central of Ga. Ry. Co., 48 Ga. 427, 172
S.E. 8z8 (Ct. App. 1934) i Hardeman v. Georgia Power Co., 42 Ga. App. 435, 156
S.E. 642 (1931);. Wolff v. Employers Fire Ins. Co., 28z Ky. 8z4, 140 S.W.zd 640
(1940); Osborne v. People's Benev. Industrial Life Ins. Co., 191 La. App. 667, 139
So. 733 (Ct. App. 1932).
5 Austin v. United States, 125 F.zd 816 ( 7th Cir. 1942); Mineo v. Eureka
Security Fire & Marine Ins. Co., z82 Pa. Super. 75, 1z5 A.zd 6x2 (1956); Poston v.
Home Ins. Co., 191 S.C. 314, 4 S.E.zd 261 (1939); Eagle, Star & British Dominions
Ins. Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 8z, 140 S.E. 314 (19z7). Wigmore apparently favors
admission of the conviction, but would not make it conclusive. 4 WIGMORE § 1346a.
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would seem far to outweigh technical obstacles to the admission of
such evidence. Undoubtedly a final judgment of conviction should be.
given some weight in a subsequent civil suit.' 6
Although the same considerations which permit admission of the:
prior conviction logically would render such evidence conclusive against
the subsequent plaintiff, it is doubtful, as a practical matter, if many
jurisdictions will break this far from tradition. Furthermore, such
treatment of the conviction denies the convicted party an opportunity
to show a prior miscarriage of justice. The prima facie rule of the.
Schindler case serves to soften the break with the traditional view by
permitting an explanation of the conviction.
2. Offensive Use
Where a conviction is offered as evidence of the fault of a con-
victed person defending a subsequent civil suit, the technicalities of the
traditional rule have prevailed over logical analysis. Here the vast
majority of the courts still hold that the plaintiff in the civil suit can-
not introduce the record of the defendant's conviction as evidence of
the facts upon which it was based.'
7
The Schindler rule, admitting prior convictions for defensive pur-
poses, developed as a reaction to the possibility of allowing a criminal
to reap the benefits of his crime. However, where the offensive use
"eA conviction from which an appeal is pending is not admissible in the subsequent
civil action as evidence of the facts involved. E.g., Stinson v. Richardson, 239 Ala.
161, 194 So. 5o8 (1940); McCauley v. Stone, 3x5 S.W.zd 476 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958) 5
Marshak v. City of Long Beach, 195 Misc. 1z5, 81 N.Y.S.zd 74 (Sup. Ct. 1948);
Pendleton v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 8z W. Va. 270, 95 S.E. 941 (1918).
However, unless an appeal has the effect of setting aside or suspending the judgment
of conviction, the pendency of an appeal does not preclude the showing of such con-
viction as bearing on the credibility of a witness. E.g., Ringer v. State 137 Tex.
Crim. 242, xz9 S.W.zd 654 (1938)5 Burford v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 752, 20
S.E.2d 509 (1942).
1E.g., Burbank v. McIntyre, 135 Cal. App. 482, 27 P.zd 400 (933)i Mont-
gomery v. Crum, 199 Ind. 66o, x61 N.E. 251 (1928)5 Pugaczewska v. Maszko,
164 Md. 355, 163 Atl. 2o5 (932); Nowak v. Orange, 349 Pa. 217, 36 A.zd 781
(1944). Of course the judgment in the criminal action is competent evidence of
its own rendition. Burt v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 187 U.S. 362 (i9o2). And
a judgment is admissible for purposes of impeachment. McCoRMICK § 43.
Statutes sometimes play an important role in the admissibility of prior convictions.
Section 5 of the Clayton Act provides for the admission of a prior criminal conviction
in a subsequent suit as evidence of the facts. 69 Stat. 283 (955), - 5 U.S.C. § I&
(1958), amending 38 Stat. 731 (1914). See Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors
Corp., 340 U.S. S58 (195o). For further examples of similar statutes see OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § x.16 (Page 1953) and statutes cited at note 24 infra.
of the conviction is attempted these policy factors are not so evident;
consequently, the exclusionary rule has retained much of its force, with
the courts relying on the traditional grounds.' 8  Thus the propriety of
permitting offensive use of prior convictions turns on whether the
plaintiff should be aided in imposing on the defendant the civil conse-
quences of his criminal act.
A growing minority of jurisdictions have become dissatisfied with
the bases of the majority rule. These courts have insisted that common
sense and consistency of adjudication require that the judgment of con-
viction, when offered against the person convicted as evidence of the
facts upon which it was based, be admitted.'9 A person accused of a
serious crime, it would seem, is motivated to put forth the best possible
defense. Consequently, a conviction following such a defense would
have sufficiently probative value to be considered 'by the trier of fact
in a subsequent civil action.2" This view is embodied in the Uniform
Rules, which provide that a conviction for a felony is admissible.21
Even those courts which allow a prior conviction as evidence of
the facts upon which it was rendered generally do not permit a con-
viction for a traffic offense to be shown.22  The validity of the rule ex-
"8 Thus according to the majority, a conviction of contempt for failure to comply
with an injunction is not admissible in a subsequent suit for damages for non-
compliance with the injunction. America Fire Protection Serv. v. Williams, x7x Cal.
App. zd 397, 340 P.zd 644 (1959). Contra, Giessler v. Accurate Brass Co., 271
App. Div. 98o, 68 N.Y.S.zd 1 (1947). And it has been held that in a wrongful
death action the plaintiff cannot introduce the conviction of the defendant for man-
slaughter. Moyle v. Brown, 133 Colo. 29, 29o P.zd xo5 (1955). It should be
pointed out that the Moyle case may be of doubtful value as precedent, for the court
based its decision upon the rule that a traffic conviction is not admissible in a subsequent
civil suit. This would seem to be faulty reasoning since the reason for excluding
traffic convictions does not apply to the exclusion of convictions for serious crimes.
See notes 23-27 infra and accompanying text. In the recent case of Trust Co. v.
Pollard, 256 N.C. 77, 123 S.E.2d 104 (196i), the North Carolina Supreme Court held,
in effect, that defendant's prior conviction of manslaughter was not admissible in a
subsequent wrongful death action. Applying the "general and traditional" rule, the
court granted a motion to strike plaintiff's allegation of defendant's prior conviction.
1"E.g., Page v. Skinner, 22o Ala. 302, 125 So. 36 (1929)i Bankston v. Folks,
38 La. Ann. 267 (x886); Wald v. Wald, 16x Md. 493, 159 At. 97 (1931); Smith
v. Minnissale, 190 Misc. 114, 75 N.Y.S.zd 645 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Bealor v. Hahn, 132
Pa. 242, 19 Atl. 74 (189o). Accord, Greenwell's Adm'r v. Burba, 298 Ky. 255, 18,
S.W.2d 436 (944).
"Probably the trend of evolution will be toward the admission generally against
a present party of any judgment or finding in a former civil or criminal case if the
party had an opportunity to defend." McCoamicic, EviDENcE § 295 at 619 (954).
21 UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENcE 63(20) (1953).
"E.g., Moseley v. Ewing, 79 So. zd 776 (Fla. x955); Padgett v. William., 8z
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cluding a traffic conviction has been widely recognized 23 and codified
by statutes in some states.24 The most potent argument for exclusion
stems from the very nature of traffic court proceedings. They are con-
ducted with less deliberation and care25 than proceedings in ordinary
criminal prosecutions, and moreover, defendants in traffic cases usually
do not defend with the same zeal as those in a serious criminal trial.
28
The exclusion of traffic convictions, either under the traditional
rule21 or as an exception to the Schindler rule, does have some validity.
However, it is difficult to see why a person accused of a serious crime
should not be held bound or at least affected by the result of a con-
viction, regardless of whether the conviction is sought to be used
offensively or defensively. The safeguards' afforded the accused are
greater in the criminal trial and he has had ample opportunity to
establish his defense before the criminal tribunal. Therefore, he would
not be prejudiced by the admission of such evidence.
Ga. App. 509, 61 S.E.zd 676 (950) ; Walther v. News Syndicate Co., 276 App. Div.
169, 93 N.Y.S.2d 537 (1949) (well reasoned opinion); Smith v. New Dixie Lines,
2o Va. 466, 1xx S.E.2d 434 (1959); Forney v. Morrison (tio S.E.zd 840 (W.Va.
'959).
Some courts do allow the traffic conviction to be shown for impeachment purposes.
E.g., Fisher v. Gunn, 270 S.W.2d 869 (Mo. 1954) ; Clinger v. Duncan, 166 Ohio
St. 216, x4 N.E.zd 156 (x957). It has also been held that admission of the con-
viction for such a purpose is within the trial court's descretion. Zeller v. Mayson,
168 Md. 663, 179 Atl. 179 (x935). Of course a party cannot impeach his own
witness by showing his traffic conviction. Eisenhower v. Baltimore Transit Co., 29o
Md. 528, 59 A.2d 313 (2948)-
"The drafters of the Uniform Rides of Evidence have expressed their realization
of the unreliability of traffic convictions as a resolution of the facts involved:
Despite the logic of this theory there is widespread opposition to opening the door
to let in evidence of convictions particularly of traffic violations in actions which
later develop over responsibility for damages. In other words, trials and con-
viction in traffic courts . .. often do not have about them the tags of trustworthi-
ness as they often are the result of expediency or compromise. To let in evidence
of conviction of a traffic violation to prove negligence and responsibility in a civil
case would seem to be going too far and for that reason this rule limits the ad-
missibility of judgments of conviction under the hearsay exception to convictions
of a felony. . . . UNIFORm RULE OF EVIDENCE 63(2o), comment (1953).
2 E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4-140 (1953) ; IowA CODE ANN. § 321.489
(x946) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.94 (x945); S.C. CODE § 46-686 (1952)5 UTAH
CODE ANN. § 4-6-170 (1953).
2 In 1936 one New York judge heard i,os6 traffic cases in 2 hours. WARREN,
TRAFFIC COURrS 12 (1942).
" RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE 335-6 (8th ed. 2958), as quoted in Ando v. Woodberry,
9 App. Div. 2d 125, 132, 292 N.Y.S.zd 414, 42o (2959).
"¢ See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
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AcQuITTALS
The majority of courts are agreed that an acquittal is inadmissible as
evidence of innocence in a subsequent civil action.2 8  These courts
soundly recognize that an acquittal signifies only that guilt was not
established beyond a reasonable doubt and does not preclude a finding
of guilt by the mere preponderance of the evidence.29 Thus, for
example, a judgment of acquittal does not bind the prosecuting gov-
ernment in a later civil suit between it and the accused where the
:standards of proof differ."0 Similarly, an acquittal of arson is inad-
inissible in a subsequent suit to recover on an insurance policy covering
the burned goods.3 ' Although it has been argued that the acquittal
should be admissible as having some tendency to prove that the de-
fendant was not guilty,32 the danger that a jury might easily exaggerate
28 E.g., Stone v. United States, x67 U.S. 178 (1897); Williams v. Cambridge Fire
Ins. Co., 23o F.zd 293 (sth Cir. x956) ; Wirt v. Fraser, 30 So. zd 174. (Fla. x947);
Clough v. Greyhound Corp., 91 Ga. App. 246, 85 S.E.zd 476 (x954) ; Tennessee Odin
Ins. Co. v. Dickey, 19o Tenn. 96, 228 S.W.zd 73 (195o). Contra, Wolff v. Em-
p~loyer's Fire Ins. Co., 282 Ky. 824, 140 S.W.zd 640 (1940) (dictum).
In a civil action growing out of a traffic accident evidence that driver of vehicle
was not arrested is not admissible, Eggers v. Phillips Hardware Co., 88 So. 2d 507
(Fla. 1956), nor is evidence that a driver was arrested admissible, Burge v. House, 94
Ohio App. 5x5, ixo N.E.zd 425 (1952). By the same token it is reversible error
to admit into evidence the record of dismissal of a criminal complaint. Ethridge v.
City of New York, 1z N.Y.S.zd 103 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, ±83 App. Div. 867, 129
N.Y.S.zd 925 (1954).
However, an acquittal may be introduced, if relevant, as evidence of its rendition.
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Thomasson, 251 F. 833 ( 4 th Cir. i918) (action for
malicious prosecution).
2 The difference in the standard of proof required precludes application of the
doctrine of res judicata as a bar to civil suit subsequent to an acquittal in a criminal
prosecution. United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485
(1950); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
Although an acquittal on a criminal charge is not a bar to a subsequent civil
action, remedial in its nature, arising out of the same facts, where the object of the
subsequent action is punishment the acquittal is a bar 5 to entertain the second proceed-
ing for punishment would subject defendant to double jeopardy. Murphy v. United
States, 272 U.S. 630 (1976) (subsequent suit remedial in nature); Coffey v. United
States, 116 U.S. 436 (1886) (subsequent suit punitive in nature).
" United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (2950)
Stone v. United States, 167 U.S. 178 (1897); Murray & Sorenson, Inc. v. United
States, 207 F.2d 19 (st Cir. 1953); United States v. Gramer, 191 F.2d 741 ( 9 th
Cir. 1951)5 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 5x F. Supp. 613 (D.D.C.
1943).
"
1Tennessee Odin Ins. Co. v. Dickey, 19o Tenn. 96, 228 S.W.2d 73 (1950).
"Bush, Criminal Convictions as Evidence in Civil Proceedings, 29 Miss. L.J. 276,
%78 (2958). At least one court has allowed the acquittal to be shown as tending to
[Vol. x962: 97
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the probative weight of an official judicial record of acquittal, despite
proper instruction, would seem to require exclusion.
PLEAS
A plea of guilty to a criminal offense is admissible in a later civil
action on the theory that it is an admission by the party who entered
the plea.3 3  This reasoning permits the introduction of the plea even
though it is later withdrawn.34  The convicted party has, however,
an opportunity to explain the circumstances under which the plea was
made.3"
Generally speaking, absent statute, the courts will permit plaintiffs
to introduce a plea of guilty by the alleged tortfeasor to a charge of
traffic violation predicated upon the same collision.30 Here again strict
support a conclusion of innocence. Patterson v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 913, 48
S.E.2d 357 (1948).
"
5 E.g., Davis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 279 F.zd 304 ( 9 th Cir. 96o) i Motley v.
Page, 25o Ala. 265, 34 So. 2d 201 (1948)i Vaughn v. Jonas, 31 Cal. 2d 586, 191
P.2d 432 (1948). But see True v. Citizens' Fund Mut. Ins. Co., 187 Minn. 636,
246 N.W. 474 (t933).
Most courts say the plea is admissible but the conviction is not. E.g., Piechota v.
Rapp, 148 Neb. 443, 27 N.W.2d 682 (1947). Wigmore belittles this, referring to it
as a "tweedle-dee and tweedle-dum distinction." 4 WIGMaORE § 1346a n.i. Prac-
tically, the distinction is not sound, for to admit the plea is virtually the same as to
inform the jury of the conviction.
"Morrissey v. Powell, 304 Mass. 268, 23 N.E.zd 411 0930- Contra,
Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927). However, evidence of a withdrawn
plea of guilty is insufcient to establish fault without additional evidence. People v.
.Steinmetz, 240 N.Y. 411, 148 N.E. 597 (1925).
"E.g., Odian v. Habernicht, 133 Cal. App. 2d 193, 283 P.zd 756 (D. Ct. App.
1955) i Race v. Chappell, 304 Ky. 788, 202 S.W.2d 626 (1947); Minasian v. Aetna
life Ins. Co., 295 Mass: 1, 3 N.E.2d 17 (1936) ; Berlin v. Berens, 76 S.D. 429, 80
N..W.2d 79 (957). Contra, Marcazzolo v. Lawrence, 20 Misc. 2d 31, 191 N.Y.S.zd
872 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
"E.g., Miller v. Blanton, 220 S.W.2d 293 (Ark. 1948)5 Kock v. Elkins, 71
Idaho 50, 225 P.2d 457 (195o); Weiss v. Wasserman, 91 N.H. x64, 15 A.2d 86x
(1940); Stanton v. Major, 274 App. Div. 864, 8z N.Y.S.2d 134 (1948); Keely
v. Arkansas Motor Freight Lines, 278 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1955). But see, Zenuk
v. Johnson, 114 Conn. 383, 158 Atl. 9io (1932)5 Baird v. Boger, 187 Ore. 131,
2xo P.2d x8 (1949). Contra, Michitsch v. Stimfel, 7 Misc. 2d 960, 164 N.Y.S.2d
246 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Max v. Brookhaven Development Corp., 262 App. Div. 907,
-8 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1941).
The mere mailing in of a fine does not constitute a plea of guilty, Mooneyhan v.
Benedict, 284 S.W.zd 741 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955), and a forfeiture of a bond after
a charge of traffic violation is not an admission and therefore is not admissible for
impeachment purposes. Stover v. Yoakum, zo9 N.E.2d 877 (Ohio Ct. App. 1952);
Sherwood v. Murray, 233 S.W.ad 879 (Tex. Civ. App. 195o). But failure to
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adherence to traditional rules without examining the policies behind
such rules has lead to an undesirable rigidity which ignores practical
realties. A plea of guilty to a criminal offense is generally admissible
because as a practical matter it does have some probative value, in that
a person prosecuted for a serious crime is generally motivated to put
forth the best possible defense. However, this analysis is patently in-
applicable in the situation involving a traffic offense, for here the accused
motorist normally has little incentive to defend vigorously. From a
practical standpoint a plea of guilty to a traffic offense has no more,
probably less, probative value than a conviction for a traffic offense
following a plea of not guilty. A court is ignoring the realities of the
situation if it says that a plea of guilty to such a charge is a solemn
confession by the one entering the plea and therefore should be ad-
mitted in evidence.17  It is apparent that motorists often plead guilty
to charges of traffic violation for a variety of reasons when they actually
believe themselves to be innocent.38
Although many courts have indicated that the defendant may explain
appear on the return day of the warrant is viewed as a plea of guilty. Lamb v.
Butler, x98 Va. 509, 95 S.E.zd 239 (1956).
"'A New York judge is reported as having said:
You have about as much chance of getting justice in a trafc court as that
smoke ring has of making a loop over the nose of the man in the moon. That
court is a madhouse, a disgrace to any civilized community. Defendants fre-
quently are considered guilty before their cases are called. Often they are lined up
in front of the bar and fined collectively. Few of them get genuine hearings.
There is no time for individual treatment. Most of the defendants plead guilty and
get out of the crush as soon as possible. Others go the limit in getting some
politician to try to fix their cases. The tragic part is that the majority of the
better class citizens get their only impression of the operation of the judiciary in
traffic courts. Compare, Telling It to the Judge, &4 Forum 79-85 (Aug. 1930) as
quoted in WARREN, TRAFFIC CouRTs 8 n.3 (1942).
" Reasons why a plea of guilty may be entered are, for example, the saving of time,
the avoidance of inconvenience and unfavorable publicity, the realization that the
contest is hopeless for lack of witnesses, and the probability that punishment will be
substantially less after a plea of guilty.
The probative value of a plea of guilty to a charge of traffic violation is even
more debatable in a jurisdiction where the plea of nolo contendere has been abolished.
Where a person has had an opportunity to plead nolo contendere and has instead
entered a plea of guilty, the plea would seem to have some value worth considering
by the trier of fact. But absent the plea of nolo contendere the accused must plead
guilty or not guilty to the traffic violation. Since no moral turpitude is attached to a
conviction for a traffic violation, there is no substantial incentive for the motorist to
attempt to plead and prove his innocence.
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the circumstances under which the plea was entered,39 the problem is
obviously not solved by shifting the inquiry to the jury. Such evidence
is highly prejudicial and when admitted has in all probability such
weight with the jury that any seeming privilege of rebuttal is nuga-
tory.40  It seems patently unfair, therefore, to admit the plea as evi-
dence of the facts upon which it was based where the punishment
following such a plea is slight, especially when compared with the
inconvenience of trial, and where there is some likelihood that the plea
was entered as a mere compromise. However, absent statutes41 the
courts have admitted pleas of guilty to traffic offenses, acknowledging
no difference between such a prosecution and one for a more serious
crime.
The courts generally have held that a plea of nolo contendere, while
admitting guilt for purposes of the action in which it is entered, re-
stricts its effect to that action and is not admissible in a civil suit as
evidence of the facts admitted by the plea. Such a plea merely repre-
sents the failure of the defendant to resist his conviction as vigorously as
possible; it'is a limited admission made solely for the purpose of the
indictment and has no further operation 42
8'E.g., Ando v. Woodberry, 8 N.Y.2d 165, 168 N.E.zd 520 (i96o). And see
cases cited in note 35 supra.
" Cammarano v. Gimino, 234 Ill. App. 556 (-9-4).
'As stated above in note 24 and accompanying text, some states have passed
statutes prohibiting the use of prior traffic convictions. In at least four of these
jurisdictions the statute has been construed as excluding 'a plea of guilty to a traffic
offense. Ripple v. Black, 132 Colo. 125, 286 P.zd 625 (1955) ; Tucker v. Heaverlo,
249 Iowa 197, 86 N.W.2d 353 (1957); Warren v. Marsh, 215 Minn. 6x5, xx
N.W.2d 528 (1943) ; Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Chugg, 6 Utah zd 399, 315 P.zd
277 (1957).
A New York statute provides that "a traffic infraction is not a crime and the
punishment imposed therefore shall not be deemed for any purpose a penal or criminal
punishment and shall not affect or impair the credibility as a witness or otherwise of
any person convicted thereof2 N.Y. VE-HiCLE & TRAFFIc LAW § 155. The New
York courts have held that this statute renders inadmissible, as proof of the facts upon
which it was based, a conviction of a traffic violation following a plea of not guilty.
Walther v. News Syndicate Co., 276 App. Div. 169, 93 N.Y.S.2d 537 (i947). How-
ever, they have held that the statute does not render inadmissible a conviction of a
traffic offense based on a plea of guilty. Ando v. Woodbury, 8 N.Y.zd 165, 168
N.E.2d 520 (196o).
"E.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Cloonan, 165 Kan. 68, 193 P.zd 658 (1951)
State v. Fitzgerald, 140 Me. 314, 37 A.2d 799 (1944). Nor is the conviction after
the plea admissible as evidence of the facts. Teslovich v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 1io
Pa. Super. 245, 168 Atl. 354 (x933), even where there is a statute providing that a
final judgment is admissible. Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 366
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CONCLUSION
While the law has remained virtually unchanged as to the ad-
missibility of pleas of guilty and acquittals, there is a definite trend
toward positing the admissibility of prior convictions upon their pro-
posed use, resulting in the admission of prior convictions only for
defensive purposes. This trend is desirable to the extent that it abro-
gates the exclusionary rule. However, the distinction drawn by many
courts between offensive use and defensive use is not a sound one. A
prior criminal conviction has the same probative value whether used
offensively or defensively. Sound logic and public policy have led
many courts to admit a conviction where it is sought to be used de-
fensively5 the same logic should lead them to admit the conviction
where it is sought to be used offensively. However, this is not to say
that all convictions should be admissible. There are some situations,
for example, traffic convictions, where the exclusionary rule does
achieve desirable results, although for independent reasons.
A rule of admissibility for convictions of serious crimes, and a rule
of exclusion for convictions which have little probative value, 8 is pref-
erable as grounded in the actual realities of criminal judicial enforce-
ment. These practical rules would aid in effectuating the public policy
of putting an end to litigation but would not impinge on the con-
victed person's right to "one day in court 4
(D. Minn. 1939). It has been held that a conviction after a plea of nolo contender
is admissible for impeachment purposes. State v. Herlihy, xoz Me. 310, 66 At. 643
(19q6). See generally, Lenvin & Meyers, Nolo Contendere: Its Nature and Im-
plications, 51 YALE LJ. x255 (1942).
'SMODEL CODE' OF EVIDENCE rule 5zx (1942) provided that all judgments of
crimes or misdemeanors were admissible. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 63(20) (1953)
states that only convictions for felonies are admissible. And see 5o COLUM. L. REV. 529
(950).
" "Much is needed in order to reshape the law of evidence to the requirements of
the society of our times. To put the matter in general terms, it is not organized upon
rational guiding principles and is embarrassed by multiplicty of inflexible detained
rules. What the prnciples should be may be put thus: Everything offered in evidence
logically contributing toward proof of a matter required to be established to maintain
a claim or defense in the case should be admitted unless a well recognized ground of
policy or of law calls for- excluding it and nothing offered is to be received unless it is
logically probative of such matter2' 5 POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 584-85 (1959).
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